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Abstract: Consciousness is, probably, the most common and the most 
mysterious experience in human life. It encompasses a stream of mental 
activities that include knowledge and recognition, emotions and feelings, 
organic dispositions, and linguistic acts, as well as altered states such as 
those provoked by drugs and pathologies, and mystical moments. 
The philosophy of mind is habitually reprimanded for neglecting to 
characterize exactly what consciousness is. In this regard there has been 
little change over the previous decades because consciousness has a wide 
assortment of meanings according to authors and disciplines.  
Consciousness is analysed in scientific perspectives such as neurosciences, 
psychology, linguistics, physics, and cybernetics. Each science highlights 
special features of consciousness‟ rooting in the subject, according to specific 
interpersonal contexts, biological developments and always as a mirror of 
the brain's complexity.  
A short state of the art of consciousness‟ studies is useful if it searches for 
constant issues beyond the variety of explorations of conscious experience. 
Beyond the psychology‟s self, the psychoanalysis‟ ego and the mental maps 
of neurosciences, we observe trends in the philosophy of mind that search 
for a dialogical ground; what relates us to the other as we say „I‟, „Thou‟ 
and „We‟, is an essential aspect of human experience and a permanent 
challenge. 
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1. Consciousness: a self-replicating entity 
As Wittgenstein reminds us, nothing seems to be so near and 
intimate and, at the same time, so remote and inaccessible from us than our 
own conscious mind. This is the challenge of consciousness: everyone 
apparently knows what it means to be conscious, but once he/she reflects, 
there is an unbridgeable gulf between the inner conscious world and what is 
out there. Can we throw some extra light on this conundrum? 
The fact that consciousness presents itself as a part of the mind and 
a part of the universe, capable of creating a model of itself, of being self-
consciousness, generated classical designations throughout history. Socrates 
speaks of the daimon, the Scholastics of the soul, Descartes of the cogito and 
more designations exist, such as spirit, animus, heart… 
Classical theories of consciousness were focused on the relationship 
of the one and the multiple, that is, the relation of being human with the 
being in which it participates. Classical philosophers narrated how 
consciousness lives in tension between different world models, or more 
accurately, how our world changes according to our consciousness, as we 
impart meaning upon data of experience. These narratives of duality brought 
us formulae such as Parmenides‟ being and appearances, Plato‟s ideas and 
phenomena, Schopenhauer‟s will and representation. 
As we ask about frameworks for studying consciousness, we could 
start by saying that the complexity of consciousness (Penrose, 1994) depends 
on the amount and type of information it uses to create a model of itself. It 
varies from infant to adult and we can question whether there is awareness 
in non-human animals, in robots and in artificial intelligence. The minds of 
children are particularly difficult to investigate; animals have very different 
shades of sensibility; the creators of artificial intelligence have the ambition 
to turn it self-conscious through quantum computers. 
May we say that elementary machines – for instance a thermostat, a 
photoelectric cell - have a zero degree of consciousness, as they use a single 
information circuit? Vegetative beings have multiple information circuits 
about water, temperature, gravity, light. Animals like insects and reptiles 
have information circuits to determine the spatial coordinates of partners, 
rivals, prey and of themselves. Social animals have information circuits 
related to the group to which they belong and the hierarchies with which 
they live, expressing themselves through emotions and gestures. 
We, human beings, beyond the previously named capacities, have the 
power of relationship, allowing us to reach self-consciousness and to extend 
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ourselves to the past through memory and to the future through promise. 
This reflection upon ourselves, as self-consciousness or cogito, is the power 
of the daimon, soul or spirit. We are not closed beings but open ones; we are 
made of relationships, of empathy with the other, the one that of himself 
says 'I' and of the others „Thou‟ and 'we'. 
2. René Descartes and the philosophers of mind  
René Descartes (1596–1650) was aptly called the father of modern 
philosophy as he settled the agenda for the study of mind. He is best known 
for his sharp distinction between the physical and the mental (Cartesian 
duality).1 The body is one sort of substance and the mind another because 
each can be conceived in terms of totally distinct attributes. The body is 
characterized by spatial extension and motion, while the private mind is 
characterized by thought.  
Descartes was an interactive dualist. He settled the starting point for 
scientific knowledge about mind and body, and the correlations between 
them. Inside the body, the brain controls sensory input and motor output. 
For him, consciousness was a state of mind, with the body having a role 
restricted to nonconscious processes and the brain a key role in linking 
matter and mind (Garvey, 2011). 
In The Passions of The Soul, Descartes (1946) progressed from 
philosophical dualism to a conception of duality in human nature grounded 
on anatomical observations. He stated that we can “think with the body” as 
genera of passions agitate the mind as they emerge bottom-up from the 
body. The mind, then, moves the pineal gland in a top-down process. In that 
interface, the rational soul creates specific types of conscious experience or 
ideas. This model of interplay, showing conflict and resolution, remains an 
inspiration for contemporary neuroscience.  
Science realized, some 150 years ago, that Descartes‟s account about 
how the body's sensory system caused the psyche's understanding of 
sensations was not right; however, we should not give away his model too 
soon. We do not accept dualism any longer – “Descartes' mistake” – as new 
perspectives are extant about how the psyche rises out of the properties of 
the cerebrum. Notwithstanding, his differentiation of mind and body 
remains a focal issue in the investigation of consciousness. 
                                                 
1 Classical dualism has proved to be a thought-provoking and never-ending source of debates 
especially in modern neurosciences: see Damasio‟s discussion of Descartes‟ philosophy in 
Descartes‟ Error and Libet‟s original interpretation of Descartes‟ dualism in Mind Time. 




Much effort was devoted since Descartes to improve the study of 
how the physical and the mental relate. These two entities were considered 
as separate substances by Leibniz (1646–1716) and built to run together in 
perfect harmony (psychophysical parallelism). George Berkeley (1685–1753) 
denied the possibility of mindless material substances (immaterialism). The 
French materialist La Mettrie (1709–1751) bluntly extended to man 
Descartes‟s idea of animals as simple automata. Conscious and voluntary 
processes would be the outcome of mechanisms, no more than that. No 
space at all for volition or instinct. Such belief is held by contemporary 
neuroscientists who search for the neural correlates of consciousness 
(Cavanna & Nani, 2014). 
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) stressed that the limitations of 
mathematics in scientific method would prevent them to describe mental 
phenomena. He pointed out that mental phenomena are individual and 
therefore inaccessible to experimental manipulation. He admitted physiology 
as a scientific discipline, but he ruled out psychology because the study of 
the mind would not support a quantitative approach.  
3. The birth of modern physiology and psychology  
The progress in physiology and psychology through psychophysics 
was a reaction against the idea that mental phenomena are not the subject of 
experimental study and mathematical modelling. The key figure was Gustav 
Fechner (1801–1887). He discovered the logarithmic connection between 
stimulus and individual sensation (Weber-Fechner law).  
With the rise of psychophysics, developments were made in the 
comprehension of the sensory system. Hermann Helmholtz (1821–1894) 
discovered the neural basis of perception. Sense organs cause equivalent 
experiences notwithstanding the way they are stimulated. A hit in my eye 
makes me "see stars" despite the hit not being connected with light. 
Helmholtz also denied consciousness as the fountain of decisions; he 
assigned them to the brain thus undermining the idea of personal 
responsibility, which is the basis of moral behaviour. His suggestion of the 
cognitive unconscious later became a battle horse of cognitive psychology. 
Wilhelm Wundt founded the first psychology laboratory in Leipzig 
in 1879. Another key figure was William James (1842–1910), who identified 
consciousness with the stream of thought. As psychology was fully 
established as a scientific discipline, Ramon y Cajal (1852-1934) proposed 
the nerve cell as the basic unit of the nervous system. 
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With Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler, C.G. Jung, and Viktor Frankl 
psychoanalysis showed the relevancy of the unconscious. In dreams, lapses 
and stereotypies, in complexes and archetypes, in the loss of meaning, the 
Self abandons his conscious attributes as it subverts language and image 
codes. Psychoanalysis offers different explanations for neurotic symptoms as 
unconscious desires; mental illnesses reveal the deterioration of the contact 
between consciousness and its neurological supports. 
The Gestalt psychologists studied the mental processes that underlie 
perception, and Jean Piaget studied the development of mental processes. 
The Gestalt slogan - the whole is more than the sum of its parts - stressed dynamic 
interactions in the nervous system and Piaget was instrumental in stressing 
the notion of development. 
The introduction of information theory by Shannon and Weaver 
(1949) was decisive for a mathematical account of cognition. This 
mathematical technique allows to quantify the amount of data in a sign, the 
pace of data transmission through a communication channel, and the limits 
of a communication channel 
Information theory acknowledged the brain as an instrument that 
can be treated as an intermodal framework for data. The main philosophical 
caveat is that data do not disclose their meaning. PCs transmit information; 
however, whether that data are important depends on whether the recipient 
can decipher it.  
Conceiving the brain as a black box led to the development of 
intelligent machines. McCulloch and Pitts (1943) stated that the neuron was 
the basic information processing unit. Cognitive psychologists started using 
"box and arrow" diagrams for portraying brain processes and data 
transmission. The relationship between box-and-arrow descriptions and 
neuroscientific mechanism descriptions became a key foundational issue for 
cognitive science (Datteri & Laudisa, 2014). 
4. Contemporary Explorations of Consciousness  
A major and innovative development for consciousness research 
during the past decades was the demonstration of the existence of 
unconscious, automatic psychological processes in perception, memory, and 
action, the so-called cognitive unconscious by John Kihlstrom (1987). Most of 
the processing undertaken by the brain occurs without our awareness 
(Velmans, 1991). However, the term “cognitive unconscious” is not widely 
accepted. The term „cognitive‟ classically referred to knowledge, beliefs, and 
attitudes, all key components of consciousness. A minority of scientists 




follows Neisser‟s Cognitive Psychology (1967) restrain the term “cognitive” - 
cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience - to refer to what the brain 
does.  
The imageology of mental procedures uncovered that consciousness 
is not a sine qua non condition of rational thought: inferring and choices can 
be made without awareness. Intelligent machines such as computers and cars 
without drivers prove that point. Subjects can recognize or segregate a 
stimulus, and that does not imply that they are aware of it.  
As consciousness is not relevant to strict rationality and for many 
kinds of decision processes, we came a long way from the Cartesian 
underestimation of the limitations of the duality of mind and body. On the 
other side, despite unconscious cognitive processes being a game changer, 
that does not liquidate first-person psychology. John Eccles and Karl Popper 
wrote The Self and Its Brain (2012) portraying interactionism as the best 
approach to the mind-body problem. Popper indicates the existence of the 
three worlds of physical objects, mental objects, and conceptual objects. 
Each world is supposed to empirically interact with the other two. Eccles 
reviews clinical cases and experimental results to build this interactionist 
thesis on neuroscientific grounds. The unity of our experience is enclosed 
into a “self-conscious mind” (Eccles & Popper, 2012). 
Consciousness goes beyond the basis of rational thought (Schneider 
& Velmans, 2007). Contemporary neurosciences map the mental activity as a 
brain activity and denounce Descartes' error but leave unresolved two major 
problems: the problem of qualia and how mental processes determine 
voluntary actions. The first issue, the relationship between conscious 
qualities (qualia) and brain activities was conceived by David Chalmers in the 
framework of property dualism. (Chalmers, 1996) According to him, mental 
properties are an irreducible and fundamental characteristic of matter, 
together with other characteristics that are merely physical. The second issue 
was raised centuries ago by Princess-Philosopher, Elizabeth of Bohemia, 
who asked Descartes to tell her how the mind, being only a thinking 
substance, could determine animal spirits to cause voluntary actions. 
Eventually, the philosopher admitted no definitive answer could be given 
(Garber, 2001). 
To explain the physical manifestations of mental acts and the mind‟s 
access to external realities is the challenge of every theory of consciousness. 
Bernard J. Baars has developed the global workspace theatre scenario, a 
cognitive stage in which activities develop both at the conscious and 
unconscious level (1997). 
What are the main questions of his model?  
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Consciousness is an information gateway to the brain. As 
neuronal networks operate, consciousness provides integration to specialized 
brain areas which otherwise would be apart. Is insight like a bright spot on 
the stage of memory concerned with perceptual and linguistic processing? 
Consciousness and information. Up to what point do we need 
consciousness to interpret new combinations of words through the linguistic 
functions of syntax and semantics? 
Consciousness and memory. Is consciousness a prerequisite to 
report features such as sensory inputs, rehearsal, and recall? 
Consciousness and learning. As memory mechanisms operate 
unconsciously, there is large cortical activation during any learning 
procedure, while it is limited to a few areas when automatic tasks occur. 
Does information necessarily go through the focus of consciousness?  
Consciousness and voluntary control. Consciousness seems the only 
way to enable higher-order cognitive functions such as problem solving and 
decision-making. Do conscious goals lead to the choice of conducts and 
ultimately, free will, the ability to voluntarily carry out actions?  
Consciousness and self. Conscious input to frontal cortical areas 
enables the interpretation and control of behaviour. Is this the only way to 
build a sense of our feelings and being the author of our own behaviour? 
Certainly, there are many kinds of consciousness. Nonetheless, we 
barely know how they are related. Are dreaming, periphery and centre 
consciousness simply quantitative variants of unfocused, half-focused, and 
self-consciousness? Or then, again, are there qualitative contrasts between 
various types of awareness? Could these inquiries about the assortments of 
awareness be replied considering the intellectual and neural associates of 
consciousness? Are portrayals and calculations just feasible for sorts of 
cognizance? Are various examples of neural action related with various types 
of consciousness? 
What about biological markers of consciousness? This inquiry has 
been honed by evidence collected about oblivion and other non-conscious 
procedures. We know to extract information about the contrasts between 
awareness and unconscious procedures. Does awareness include explicit 
sorts of calculations and portrayals? Is it true that they are related with 
explicit sorts of neural action, and localized in the mind?~ 
How do we determine the presence of consciousness?  This is a 
pragmatic question that confronts clinicians in therapy units and operating 
theatres. Is a brain- damaged patient in a coma (i.e., unconscious) or is he, 
instead, in a locked- in state conscious about everything that is being said, 
but unable to move his body? If evidence of consciousness is inferred 




behaviourally, does the classification of patients into coma, minimally 
conscious, persistent vegetative state or locked- in syndrome reflect an 
underlying degree of consciousness of such patients?  
To determine the presence of consciousness we must find reliable 
neural correlates or then, again, some method for speaking with the patient. 
The varieties of conscious experience most handily considered by science lie 
in human adults; science attends to brain conditions and its quality and 
appearance in events of awakening, sleeping, dreaming, and extreme 
lethargies, and even coma. Yet, how would we determine awareness when an 
elevated level of correspondence is not accessible? Neural markers of 
consciousness are important for deciding awareness but they do not exhaust 
the mystery of consciousness. 
5. Further perspectives 
Whatever analytic progress is made in scientific and philosophical 
perspectives, the elusiveness of consciousness remains. Some difficulties are 
resolved, but new ones have emerged.  
We may sum up by saying that as the 19th century started – the 
epoch of philosophical idealism - there was little differentiation among life 
and consciousness; both were held accountable of vital energies impervious 
to experimental examination. At the beginning of the 21st century, we know 
that life does not depend upon a vital essence, but we are still not sure about 
what consciousness is.  
The demonstration of unconscious processes sharpened the issues 
addressed by philosophical studies. Contemporary philosophical hypotheses 
about consciousness address inquiries such as: what kind of links does 
consciousness has with cosmos? How does it relate with the brain?  What 
kind of issues can be settled by experimental research, and what can be 
comprehended through a philosophical conceptualization of those issues? 
What main models are available for our comprehension of the human being, 
who is simultaneously body, brain, and mind?   
Contemporary philosophers of mind pay attention to scientific 
results, the record of neural procedures that catches the embodiment of our 
experience; as they start from the observation of what means to be 
conscious, that reality of the felt quality of our experiences makes them 
engage first-person issues; philosophers question our second-person 
conscious relationship with the world and the other. 
Is conscious experience altogether dictated by the basic conditions 
of the cerebrum? Is conscious experience fit for causing occasions in our 
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cerebrums and the world at large? What is the connection between qualia – 
the felt nature of experience - and conscious states?  
Philosophical investigations of consciousness attempt to locate it 
inside human existence. Intentional consciousness builds the world of 
objects through acts of knowledge: to experiment intently; to understand 
what has awakened our attention; to judge what we understand in our 
experiments; to evaluate the consequences of judgments: to identify 
ourselves with other people (Henriques, 2010, 2016). 
Neuroscientific investigations of the psyche are centred around the 
cerebrum equipment ("wetware") that epitomizes mental procedures; and 
neuroscientific investigations of cognizance focus around discovering its 
neural causes and correlates. 
Neuroscientific research has two major obvious philosophical 
implications, namely for ethics and for legal responsibility: 1) the extent to 
which the qualia of consciousness are determined by the functional relations 
of particular brain areas to activities in the external world 2) the free will 
problem that asks if deliberate activities are controlled by cognizant 
decisions or by preconscious mindsets. 
In social psychology there is a re-established enthusiasm for 
exploring how individuals behave in various social circumstances: through 
subjective strategies and quantitative techniques. Studies of perception, 
cognition, emotion, for example, rely to some extent on subjective reports - 
verbal reports, overt response, filling out a questionnaire. 
First-person examinations of awareness deal with how one can 
explore conscious experience, an issue that concerns psychologists but that 
cannot be eradicated from philosophy because there is no consciousness 
without language. Consciousness expresses itself through language which is 
a set of meanings transmitted by words. The identity between reason and 
language resides in the logos. Each language is a set of meanings shared by 
humans. Speech is the individual use of language through which the subject 
recognizes himself, understanding concepts and realizing relationships. 
Language, besides conceptualizing our experience through general and 
abstract (Datteri & Laudisa, 2014) names, contains the pronouns and 
indicators of subjective spatial and temporal relationships generated by the 
relationships of the self with others which bring us to the second-person 
level of research of the mind. 
I presented a short overview of contemporary consciousness‟ 
studies. There is another fundamental word of consciousness that was not 
focused here, that is, recognition. Recognition originates second-person 
studies based on the I-thou relationship. Objects are intentionally 




apprehended, but beings are existentially recognized. We want to know the 
world, and the world wants to be recognized. We relate with beings that are 
more than mere objects as they manifest themselves outside the chain of 
causes and in reciprocity with us. Consciousness is relational because the 
other brings us into a common reality.   
Encounters or acts of recognition result from relationship in 
consciousness and originate the ethics of human dialogue, the aesthetic of 
creation and enjoyment of art and the epiphany of celebrations. In these 
encounters it is as if, suddenly, we listened to the music to whose score we 
had no access and of which until then, we had only heard loose notes. Our 
discoveries, decisions, revolts, loves, struggles and reconciliations are thus 
born. The narrative of such celebrations, the feast day of consciousness, 
would require a new paper.  
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